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INTRODUCTION 
 The Tax Relief and Healthcare Act of 2006 strengthened the in-
centives for whistleblowers to expose large-scale tax evasion.1 For 
information provided to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) after De-
cember 19, 2006, the new section 7623(b)2 of the Internal Revenue 
Code (Code) authorizes whistleblowers to receive an award of 15% to 
30% of proceeds collected from owed taxes as a direct result of their 
tip.3 Section 7623(b) of the Code applies to whistleblowing on taxpay-
ers when the amount in dispute exceeds $2 million.4 The percentage 
of an award is based on the extent to which the whistleblower “sub-
stantially contributed” to the collection.5  
 Incentives for whistleblowers have become increasingly necessary, 
especially in the context of tax evasion and tax deficiencies. The IRS 
estimates that the difference between what U.S. taxpayers should 
                                                                                                                                 
 ? C.P.A.; J.D. Candidate 2016, Florida State University College of Law. 
 1. Tax Relief and Healthcare Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 2922, 
2958 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7623). 
 2. Prior to the amendment that added section 7623(b) of the Code, the statute only 
contained section 7623(a) of the Court, which was a discretionary payout system for infor-
mation that led to the collection of evaded taxes. See infra Part II.A.  
 3. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2012) (“[A]s an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 
percent of the collected proceeds (including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and addi-
tional amounts) resulting from the action (including any related actions) or from any set-
tlement in response to such action.”). 
 4. Id. § 7623(b)(5). 
 5. Id. § 7623(b)(1). 
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have paid and what they actually paid is $385 billion annually.6 
While many factors contribute to this gap, “the vast majority of the 
tax gap is attributable to underreported taxes.”7 Without the help of 
inside information, the IRS would likely not audit most of the people 
or entities that owe a substantial amount in unpaid taxes,8 much less 
uncover sophisticated tax evasion schemes.9  
 In 2009, it was discovered that the Swiss bank UBS was responsi-
ble for one of the largest tax evasion schemes in United States histo-
ry.10 The scheme was not exposed until a former UBS banker, Brad-
ley Birkenfeld, blew the whistle.11 This act alone resulted in the dis-
covery of over 14,000 wealthy Americans who were evading taxes.12 
As a result of tipping off the IRS, Birkenfeld was awarded $104 mil-
lion for the information.13 This award was issued even though he had 
to serve two and a half years in prison for withholding information 
about his own role in the tax evasion scheme.14 Thus, even if convict-
ed of a crime relating to the tax evasion, whistleblowers may be able 
to receive an award if they did not “plan or initiate” the actions that 
led to the underpayment of tax.15  
 Luckily for the IRS, no shortage of tips exist. In 2013, the IRS re-
ceived 9268 claims from whistleblowers.16 This added to the current 
                                                                                                                                 
 6. Karie Davis-Nozemack & Sarah J. Webber, Lost Opportunities: The Underuse of 
Tax Whistleblowers 4 (Aug. 16, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2483064.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Budget Cuts Stopping IRS From Catching Tax Cheats, N.Y. POST (Feb. 24, 2015), 
available at http://nypost.com/2015/02/24/budget-cuts-stopping-irs-from-catching-tax-cheats/ 
(“Last year, the IRS audited 1.2 million individual tax returns. That’s less than 1 percent of 
the returns filed and the lowest rate since 2004” as a direct result of budget cuts.)  
 9. See Calvin Johnson, Ending Reliance on Opinions of the Taxpayer’s Own Lawyer, 
141 TAX NOTES 947, 957 (2013) (“IRS agents are undertrained regarding sophisticated 
transactions.”). 
 10. The IRS reported collecting over $5 billion in unpaid taxes after Bradley Birken-
feld blew the whistle. David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S., 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/09/12/business/whistle-blower-awarded-104-million-by-irs.html.  
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. (“During the investigation Mr. Birkenfeld was charged with fraud for with-
holding crucial information from federal investigators, including details of his top client, 
the property developer Igor Olenicoff.”). 
 15. The statute does not allow individuals who “planned and initiated the actions that 
led to the underpayment of tax[es]” to receive awards. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(3) (2012). How-
ever, individuals who participated in the action but who did not plan or initiate it are still 
able to receive awards. See id. The focus appears to be on the main actors rather than the 
participants like Birkenfeld.   
 16. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2013 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE 
USE OF SECTION 7623, 14 (2013) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/ 
Whistleblower_Annual_report_FY_13_3_7_14_52549.pdf. 
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backlog of over 22,300 open claims.17 While tips have increased after 
the enactment of section 7623(b) of the Code, the payouts have not 
been as plentiful.18 In fact, the IRS has paid out only nine awards 
under the new whistleblower statute.19  
 The lack of awards issued by the IRS is surprising considering 
how effective the new provision has been in the collection of taxes. 
From 2009 to 2013, the IRS collected nearly $1.7 billion in back taxes 
as a direct result of whistleblowers.20  Apparently Birkenfeld was not 
the only person aware of tax evasion. There was a substantial in-
crease in tips after enactment of section 7623(b) of the Code21 because 
the section appeared to demand an award in certain circumstances.22 
The Tax Court even acknowledged that the new section of the Code 
“provides for mandatory awards if certain requirements are met.”23 
However, in reality, payouts have remained relatively stagnant un-
der section 7623(a) of the Code,24 and have been almost nonexistent 
under section 7623(b) of the Code.25 Denials of awards under the new 
whistleblower statute have been appealed to the Tax Court.26  
 This Note will address the appropriate scope of review for the Tax 
Court. The “scope of review” refers to what evidence the Tax Court 
may consider when determining whether the IRS acted appropriate-
ly.27 In theory, the Tax Court could either limit its review to the ad-
ministrative record (the evidence the IRS considered when making 
its determination) or it could develop its own evidentiary record. 28 
                                                                                                                                 
 17. See id.  
 18. Id. at 21 (110 awards paid in FY 2009, 97 awards paid in FY 2010, 97 awards paid 
in FY 2011, 128 awards paid in FY 2012, and 122 awards paid in FY 2013). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. ($1,678,316,545 total amounts collected from FY 2009 to FY 2013). 
 21. Id. at 14 (1117 claims received pre-2007 and 9268 in FY 2013); TREASURY 
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REF NO. 2009-30-114, DEFICIENCIES EXIST IN THE 
CONTROL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS 6 (2009) [hereinafter 
DEFICIENCIES] available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/ 
200930114fr.pdf (83 claims received in 2007 alleging $8 billion in underreported income; 
1890 claims in 2008 alleging $65 billion in underreported income). 
 22. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 16, at 1 (stating that providing infor-
mation under the new statute “generally requires the IRS to pay awards if information an 
individual provides substantially contributes to the collection” of evaded taxes). 
 23. Lippolis v. Comm’r, No. 18172-12W, 2014 WL 6603864, at *2 (T.C. Nov. 20, 2014). 
 24. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 16, at 14. 
 25. See id. at 21 (noting nine awards paid under section 7623(b) of the Code). 
 26. Whistleblowers must appeal an award determination within thirty days to the 
Tax Court. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4) (2012). 
 27. Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 989 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 28. Id. at 982. 
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 Limiting the review to the administrative record is known as the 
“record rule.”29 The record rule is considered a deferential standard 
because the agency determines what goes into the record.30 Current-
ly, there are no documents (for example, statutes, Treasury Regula-
tions, Internal Revenue Manual provisions, or court decisions) that 
establish what should be included in the administrative file; there 
are only proposed Treasury Regulations.31 
 Alternatively, the Tax Court could consider evidence outside of the 
administrative record.32 Whistleblowers prefer this scope because of 
the IRS’s poor track record of maintaining evidence33 and the current 
lack of guidance concerning what evidence is required to be in the 
administrative record.34  
 This Note has four major parts. Part I describes the background of 
the whistleblower statute, detailing Congress’s amendments to the 
previous tax whistleblower statute. Part II explores the current state 
of the law, highlighting both the problems within the Whistleblower 
Office and the problems that whistleblowers have encountered when 
trying to obtain meaningful review after denials. These problems 
have largely been created by a lack of transparency as well as inade-
quacies within the IRS. Part III argues that the Tax Court should not 
limit itself to the administrative record. This part develops the ar-
gument by analyzing how administrative law, which generally re-
quires the record rule on review of agency decisions,35 does not con-
fine the Tax Court to the record. Part IV concludes by describing the 
necessity of a review not limited to the administrative record.  
I.   DEVELOPMENT OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 
A.   Prior to the 2006 Amendments 
 A program issuing awards for blowing the whistle on tax evasion 
is not a new concept. Since 1867,36 the IRS has been authorized to 
                                                                                                                                 
 29. Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 58 (2004) (“The record rule refers to the general rule 
of administrative law that a court can engage in judicial review of an agency action based 
only on consideration of the record amassed by the agency (the administrative record).”). 
 30. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-3(e) (2012) (proposing what should be included in the 
administrative record).  
 31. See id. 
 32. Wilson, 99 T.C.M (CCH) at 1552 (“A trial de novo entails independent factfinding 
and legal analysis unmarked by deference to the administrative agency.”). 
 33. The IRS has continually experienced significant failures with its internal controls. 
These failures have cast substantial doubt on the reliability of the administrative record. 
See infra Part II.C.  
 34. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-3(e). 
 35. See Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA], 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 36. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 7, 14 Stat. 471, 473 (codified as amended at 
I.R.C. § 7623(a) (2012)). 
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pay discretionary awards under section 7623(a) of the Code for 
“(1) detecting underpayments of tax, or (2) detecting and bringing to 
trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue 
laws or conniving at the same.”37 This section gave the IRS complete 
discretion over whether to issue an award. 38  When issued, the 
amounts ranged from a minimum award of 1% to a maximum award 
of 15% of the amounts recovered, with a cap of $10 million.39 
 A 1% award was available for providing general information that 
caused an investigation but had no direct relationship to a recovery 
of taxes.40 A 10% award was available if the whistleblower’s infor-
mation indirectly led to a collection.41 A 15% award was available if 
the information directly led to the recovery.42 The only way to receive 
an award more than 15% was to enter into a special agreement with 
the IRS.43 This discretionary system resulted in a great amount of 
uncertainty for whistleblowers.44   
 Prior to enacting section 7623(b) of the Code, the whistleblower 
statute did not grant jurisdiction to a court for whistleblowers to ap-
peal award determinations.45 Whistleblowers attempted to obtain ju-
dicial review under the Tucker Act, which grants jurisdiction to the 
United States Court of Federal Claims to hear contract claims 
against the United States in excess of $10,00046 Thus, in order to ap-
peal an award determination, a whistleblower would have to estab-
lish that a contract existed with the IRS regarding the award. How-
ever, courts consistently held that IRS administrative guidelines do 
not themselves create a contract.47 Contracts were only recognized if 
                                                                                                                                 
 37. I.R.C § 7623(a). 
 38. Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 6, at 10. 
 39. The cap was $10 million for payments made after November 7, 2002, but before 
the 2006 amendments. S. REP. NO. 109-336, at 30-32 (2006). 
 40. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. PUBL’N 733, REWARDS FOR INFORMATION PROVIDED BY 
INDIVIDUALS TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (2004), available at 
http://www.unclefed.com/IRS-Forms/2005/p733.pdf. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, REF. NO. 
2006-30-092, THE INFORMANTS’ REWARDS PROGRAM NEEDS MORE CENTRALIZED 
MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT 2 (2006) [hereinafter INFORMANTS’ REWARDS PROGRAM], availa-
ble at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports/200630092fr.pdf. 
 44. Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 6, at 10. 
 45. Compare I.R.C § 7623 (2012), with id. § 7623(b)(4) (the latter grants jurisdiction to 
the Tax Court).  
 46. 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1) § (2012). Cf. id. § 1346(a)(2) (the federal district courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims over contract claims of $10 thou-
sand or less). 
 47. See, e.g., Cambridge v. United States, 558 F.3d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Krug 
v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 96, 98 (1998).  
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special negotiations took place between the IRS and the person seek-
ing an award.48 This requirement proved fatal for most appeals.  
 Furthermore, even if a contract was established, the Court of Fed-
eral Claims used an abuse of discretion standard of review.49 This 
standard requires the whistleblower to prove that the IRS abused its 
discretion by acting arbitrarily and unreasonably in making or deny-
ing an award.50 This was very difficult to prove because the IRS 
claimed to be unable to provide critical information about denials due 
to confidentiality and disclosure laws.51 The result was that determi-
nations by the IRS were essentially final.52 With rare exception, there 
would be no recourse for a whistleblower that was denied an award.53 
 While this program was a good start to narrow the annual tax gap 
of $385 billion,54 it failed to reach its full potential for several rea-
sons. First, whistleblowers disliked the uncertainty of payouts, espe-
cially because there was, and currently still is, no protection against 
retaliation.55 Why risk your career56 or economic security57 if there is 
no certainty of an award? Second, this uncertainty was exacerbated 
by the lack of options for a meaningful appeal. The statute did not 
provide jurisdiction to a specific court and appeal was nearly impos-
sible due to the requirement of a contract with the IRS. Third, even if 
an appeal was allowed, the whistleblower had to overcome a deferen-
tial standard favoring the IRS with practically no workable infor-
mation about why their whistleblowing did not lead to the collection 
of taxes.58  
                                                                                                                                 
 48. Lagermeier v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 758, 760 (1977) (“The court has long rec-
ognized, absent special negotiations between the IRS and the person seeking an award, 
that there is no contractual obligation to make a definite award.”). 
 49. See id. at 760-61. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See infra Part II.B.  
 52. See Krug v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 96, 98 (1998) (“Absent factual allegations 
that raise substantial doubts to the integrity of the IRS procedure, plaintiff has no claim”), 
aff’d, 168 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 53. Whistleblowers could have also attempted to obtain relief through the APA.  See 
generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96 (2012). However, this did not appear to be a common course 
of action.  
 54. Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 6, at 4. 
 55. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 16, at 7 (“Unlike other laws that encourage 
whistleblowers to report information to the government, section 7623 does not prohibit 
retaliation against the whistleblower.”). 
 56. See Lagermeier v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 758, 759-60 (1977) (noting that the 
plaintiff quit his job of over twenty-eight years, forfeiting his benefits and pension, to turn 
over information of corporate tax fraud to the IRS). 
 57. See Whistleblower 14106-10W v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 183, 192-206 (2011) (allowing a 
whistleblower to seal his or her identity in order to prevent retaliation and professional 
ostracism).  
 58. See infra Part II.B for further discussion on the lack of explanations from the IRS.  
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B.   2006 Amendments and Aftermath 
 The decision to overhaul the program came after the Treasury In-
spector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) audited the Pro-
gram in June 2006.59 Even with all of the notable flaws, the TIGTA 
audit revealed that the Program generated significant revenue but 
could potentially generate more.60 Accordingly, Congress attempted 
to strengthen the existing statute through the Tax Relief and 
Healthcare Act of 2006, which created section 7623(b) of the Code.61  
 First, section 7623(b) of the Code provides a 15% to 30% award 
from the collected proceeds if the tip alleged tax delinquencies of $2 
million or more.62 The previous statute did not directly mention per-
centages.63 By authorizing the specific 15% to 30% payouts, Congress 
seemed to remove award uncertainty for whistleblowing on tax eva-
sions over $2 million.64 The focus on large-scale tax deficiencies was 
further emphasized by Congress’s removal of the prior $10 million 
award cap. 65 This removal signaled that Congress intended to offer 
bigger awards in exchange for better tips. 66 As was seen with the 
UBS banker, Bradley Birkenfeld, these awards can even be paid to 
whistleblowers that participated in the efforts to evade taxes.67 The 
new statute appeared to aggressively pursue closing the tax gap, 
even if that meant issuing an award to someone who participated in 
the operation.  
 Second, the statute now authorizes whistleblowers to appeal the 
IRS’s determination to the Tax Court.68 The previous statute did not 
confer jurisdiction upon any court to hear such appeals.69 However, 
while whistleblowers now have potential recourse to a specific court, 
                                                                                                                                 
 59. See Karie Davis-Nozemack & Sarah Webber, Paying the IRS Whistleblower: A 
Critical Analysis of Collected Proceeds, 32 VA. TAX REV. 77, 84-85 (2012). 
 60. INFORMANTS’ REWARDS PROGRAM, supra note 43, at 1-2. 
 61. See Tax Relief and Healthcare Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 
2922, 2958 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7623 (2012)). 
 62. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 16, at 3. Smaller claims (under $2 million) 
are still allowed under section 7623(a) of the Code, but this Note focuses on section 7623(b) 
of the Code.  
 63. See I.R.C. § 7623. 
 64. Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 6, at 10-11 (“Congress combined a high 
threshold for tax whistleblower claims with much needed award certainty to focus the Pro-
gram on high dollar tax abuse cases.”). 
 65. See id. 
 66. Tom Herman, Tipster Rewards Require Patience, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2007, 12:01 
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119862937462949815 (“Congress hope[d] the lure of 
much bigger rewards w[ould] prompt more informants to offer better tips and help the IRS 
reduce the nation’s . . . tax gap.”). 
 67. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(3); Kocieniewski, supra, note 10.  
 68. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4). 
 69. See id. § 7623. 
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a meaningful appeal still may not exist if the Tax Court is unable to 
review adequate and reliable evidence.  
C.   Why Scope of Review Is Critical for a 
Meaningful Appeal 
 Recent cases have demonstrated how reliance on the administra-
tive record may frustrate judicial review and result in meaningless 
appeals. In Insinga v. Commissioner, Joseph Insinga, the managing 
director of the American operations of a privately held Dutch Bank, 
blew the whistle.70 He alleged that the bank helped facilitate tax eva-
sion by seven Fortune 100 companies and ninety-five other compa-
nies.71 Insinga had several meetings with the IRS and provided sub-
stantial evidence demonstrating the systematic tax fraud being or-
chestrated by the bank.72 After these communications, Insinga waited 
for several years while the IRS completed its investigations.73 
 In November 2010, Insinga noticed that three of the companies he 
implicated for tax evasion had either settled or were about to settle 
with the IRS.74 The IRS confirmed his suspicion but refused to com-
ment on whether there was a “nexus” between his whistleblowing 
and the settlements.75 These companies would be paying hundreds of 
millions of dollars to the Treasury before the end of May 2011.76 Gen-
eral Mills alone had to pay $425 million.77 
 On September 30, 2011, Robert B. Gardner, the Whistleblower 
Office Program Manager, stated that he received all of the infor-
mation needed from Insinga and passed along his award recommen-
dation to the Whistleblower Office Director, Steven Whitlock.78 An 
award appeared imminent because agent Gardner confirmed that all 
of Insinga’s claims were open and that none were even under consid-
                                                                                                                                 
 70. Insinga blew the whistle on April 2, 2007. Petition for Whistleblower Action Under 
Code Section 7623(b)(4), Insinga v. Comm’r, No. 4609-12W, 2012 WL 864738 (Feb. 21, 
2012) [hereinafter Petition for Whistleblower Action]. 
 71. Id. at 3. 
 72. Insinga provided Internal Audit Reports, Internal Credit Applications and Re-
views, and explained how the bank was assisting all of these companies in evading taxes in 
the United States. Id. 
 73. Insinga was contacted three years later on May 10, 2007, to schedule a meeting 
with the IRS. Id. 
 74. Id. at 11. Through SEC filings and other financial reports, it was “abundantly 
clear” that three of the companies had settled. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 12. 
 78. Id. at 12-13. 
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eration for rejection.79 One week later, the Director returned the rec-
ommendation and requested additional information from the IRS 
field offices.80  
 In early November 2011, Insinga was informed that the IRS dis-
covered “other sources” of the detailed information that he had pro-
vided to the IRS in April 2007.81 In his petition to the Tax Court, In-
singa emphasizes the near impossibility of the IRS obtaining “other 
sources” related to his claim.82  
 Thus, after years of cooperation and patience, Insinga was denied 
an award without a reasonable explanation.83 He is now appealing 
the IRS’s determination to the Tax Court.84 Evidence related to these 
“other sources” is clearly paramount in this case. The Tax Court will 
either look at information that the IRS is able to compile to develop 
the administrative record85 or it can develop its own record. This 
demonstrates the importance of the Tax Court’s scope of review and 
its potential effect on appeals of whistleblowers’ determinations.  
II.   THE CURRENT STATE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 
 Although section 7623(b) of the Code was enacted in 2006,86 there 
has not been a significant amount of case law related to appeals. The 
Tax Court has ruled primarily on jurisdictional issues.87 The lack of 
appeals to date is primarily because the IRS has been slow in pro-
cessing tips.88 Due to the increase in tips after the enactment of sec-
tion 7623(b) of the Code,89 it is expected that many whistleblowers 
                                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. at 12 (“Agent Gardner also stated in this conversation and in later emails 
that all of Petitioner’s claims were ‘open’ and that none were ‘even under consideration 
for rejection.’ ”). 
 80. Id. at 13. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Petition for Whistleblower Action, supra note 70, at 13 (“It is also noteworthy, if 
not incredible, that these new ‘other sources’ of information evidently attached equally, 
across the board, and at the same time, to the most sensitive activities of each and every 
one of the diverse, unrelated entities that were the subjects of Petitioner’s submission.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 15.  
 85. See infra Part II.C (explaining the internal control failures within the IRS).  
 86. Tax Relief and Healthcare Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 2922, 
2958 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7623 (2012)). 
 87. See, e.g., Kasper v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 37, 38 (2011) (holding that each Whistle-
blower Office letter that denies a whistleblower claim is a “determination” within the 
meaning of section 7623(b)(4) of the Code, which gives the Tax Court jurisdiction and starts 
the 30-day appeal period). 
 88. Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 6, at 12 (“For many reasons, not the least 
of which is that a tax whistleblower may only be compensated from proceeds that the [IRS] 
actually collects from the taxpayer, the process may take the better part of a decade for a 
whistleblower.”). 
 89. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 16, at 14.  
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will be appealing to the Tax Court in the coming years. A major issue 
yet to be resolved is the appropriate scope of review for appeals to the 
Tax Court.   
 This section explores the considerations that the Tax Court should 
weigh when determining the scope of review. It highlights three main 
issues: First, the initial appeals under section 7623(b) of the Code 
have demonstrated the IRS’s lack of cooperation with whistleblowers. 
Currently, the relationship between the IRS and whistleblowers re-
sembles adversaries. The lack of awards issued may be an indicator of 
the IRS’s unwillingness to work with whistleblowers. Second, determi-
nations that deny a whistleblower an award have provided no explana-
tion for the denial. This lack of transparency may be detrimental to 
appeals if not compensated for elsewhere. Third, there is substantial 
reason to doubt the reliability of the administrative record. 
A.   Lack of Cooperation by the IRS 
 Even the limited case law to date relating to appeals of whistle-
blower determinations demonstrates the IRS’s unwillingness to work 
with whistleblowers and issue appropriate awards. One such exam-
ple is Anonymous 1 and Anonymous 2 v. Commissioner, in which two 
former employees of a consulting firm submitted a tip to the IRS in 
2009.90  The tip alleged that the consulting firm conducted bogus-
refund schemes that totaled approximately $150 million.91 In 2011, 
the IRS rejected the claim even though it opened its own “independ-
ent investigation” against that exact consulting firm after receiving 
the tip.92 The whistleblowers appealed the IRS’s determination, and 
ultimately lost in Tax Court.93 The Court dismissed the appeal be-
cause the IRS asserted that it “did not use the information the [whis-
tleblowers] provided, did not proceed with an administrative or judi-
cial action against the taxpayers based on [the whistleblowers’] in-
formation, and did not collect tax proceeds based on [the whistle-
blowers’] information.”94 The Court appeared suspicious of the IRS’s 
independent investigation.95 However, it ruled against the whistle-
                                                                                                                                 
 90. Order and Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, Anonymous 1 and Anony-
mous 2 v. Comm’r, No. 12472-11W, at 1 (T.C. May 10, 2013), available at 
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InternetOrders/DocumentViewer.aspx?IndexSearchableOrders
ID=103945. 
 91. Lynnley Browning, Incentives for Tax Fraud Tipsters May Get Even Tinier, 
FORTUNE (Mar. 4, 2013, 2:51 PM), available at http://fortune.com/2013/03/04/incentives-for-
tax-fraud-tipsters-may-get-even-tinier/. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Order and Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, supra note 90, at 1. 
 95. Id. at 2. (“While we question whether the information provided by [the whistle-
blowers] was used in the subsequent investigation, section 7623 of the Code does not pro-
vide a mechanism for [the whistleblowers] to challenge [the IRS’s] assertion.”). 
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blowers based on the IRS’s assertions.96 These assertions proved to be 
misleading.  
 In 2013, the IRS changed its mind and sent the whistleblowers a 
letter to inform them that it was reopening their claim.97 The IRS indi-
cated that it was in fact using the whistleblowers’ information to initi-
ate administrative action against the consulting firm. Now hopeful, 
the whistleblowers requested that the Tax Court vacate its original 
order and reconsider an award after the IRS completed its investiga-
tion.98 The IRS asked the Court to deny this request, asserting the Tax 
Court was aware of the possibility of a subsequent investigation when 
it denied the whistleblower’s appeal.99 The Tax Court disagreed. 
 In an Order dated May 10, 2013, Judge Foley expressed his dissat-
isfaction with the IRS. He found that the IRS’s statements were mis-
leading100 because the IRS appeared to have actually used the infor-
mation that it claimed it did not use.101 The IRS failed to mention to 
that Tax Court that it was considering subsequent action relating to 
the whistleblowers’ original claims.102 And, most egregiously, the IRS 
failed to inform the Court that it did, in fact, reopen the whistleblow-
er’s original award claims.103 Accordingly, the Court vacated its deci-
sion and allowed the whistleblowers another chance at an award.104 
Unfortunately for whistleblowers, this case is not an outlier.  
 In Ringo v. Commissioner, the IRS again tried to deny a whistle-
blower an award based on misinformation.105 On November 7, 2012, 
the IRS sent the whistleblower a determination letter stating that he 
was ineligible for an award because he did not provide information 
that resulted in the collection of owed taxes from the target.106 The 
whistleblower appealed and the IRS once again backpedalled on its 
                                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. at 1-2. 
 97. Id. at 2. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (“ ‘The Court’s Order and Decisions specifically made reference to the [whistle-
blower’s] information and [the IRS’s] subsequent investigation; the Court granted respond-
ent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, aware of that possibility.’ ”). 
 100. Id. (“[The IRS’s] statement is misleading. The Court was aware that [the IRS] 
opened a subsequent investigation, however, [the IRS] assured the Court that the SB/SE 
investigation was independent and that the information [the whistleblowers’] provid-
ed . . . was not being used.”). 
 101. Id. (“It appears, despite [the IRS’s] assertions to the contrary, that the information 
provided by [the whistleblowers] . . . has been used by [the IRS] in the SB/SE investigation.”). 
 102. Id. (“[The IRS] . . . failed to inform the Court that [it] was considering reopening 
[the whistleblowers’] original award claims.”). 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. See Ringo v. Comm’r, No. 29562-12W, 2014 WL 4976226, at *1 (T.C. Oct. 6, 2014). 
 106. Id.  
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determination.107 On June 11, 2013, the IRS informed the whistle-
blower that the determination was sent in error and that it was still 
considering his application for an award.108 
 As such cases demonstrate, complete reliance on the IRS may be 
ill-advised, and meaningful appeals are critical for whistleblowers. It 
would be very improbable for the Tax Court to invalidate a determi-
nation when the IRS asserts that it did not use the information to 
collect evaded taxes.109 In order to overcome such assertions, whistle-
blowers would have to set forth specific facts indicating that the IRS, 
in fact, initiated an administrative action based upon the tip provid-
ed.110 Thus, the Tax Court must consider enough evidence in order to 
determine that the IRS’s actions were appropriate. Whistleblowers, 
like the cases mentioned above, should not be denied appeals because 
of misinformation. This is particularly important because the IRS 
appears reluctant to issue awards.  
 While the IRS is currently sluggish at processing tips,111 the big-
gest threat to the whistleblower statute’s long-term success may be 
the lack of awards. Congress correctly recognized that strengthening 
the whistleblower statute would likely increase tips112  and collec-
tions.113 Yet, despite these increases, the IRS has not responded ac-
cordingly with an increase in awards.114 Since 2006, only nine awards 
have been paid under section 7623(b) of the Code.115  The lack of 
awards may serve as a deterrent to future whistleblowers and un-
dermine the legitimacy of the Whistleblower Office.  
 Senator Charles Grassley, the author of the new tax whistleblower 
statute, noted in a letter to Treasury Secretary Geithner dated June 
21, 2010:  
                                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. at *2. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Order and Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, supra note 90, at 1. 
 110. U.S. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & PROC. 121(d) (2012), available at 
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/rules/Title_XII.pdf (“When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of such party’s pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine dispute for trial.”). 
 111. DEFICIENCIES, supra note 21, at 3 (“A lack of standardized procedures and limited 
managerial oversight resulted in control weaknesses. It took more than 7 ½ years from the 
receipt of the initial claim to the payment of the award.”). 
 112. Id. at 6 (83 claims received in 2007 alleging $8 billion in underreported income, 
1890 claims in 2008 alleging $65 billion in underreported income); INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., supra note 16, at 14 (1117 claims received pre-2007, 9268 in FY 2013).   
 113. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 16, at 21 ($1,678,316,545 total amounts 
collected from FY 2009 to FY 2013). 
 114. Id. (110 awards paid in FY 2009, 97 awards paid in FY 2010, 97 awards paid in 
FY 2011, 128 awards paid in FY 2012, and 122 awards paid in FY 2013). 
 115. Id. (noting nine awards paid under section 7623(b) of the Code). 
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I have learned from my almost three decades of experience with 
whistleblowers that government agencies will often seek to un-
dermine or undercut the whistleblower. Prior to the 2006 changes, 
there was a culture of hostility towards and intimidation of whis-
tleblowers at the IRS. That is why I created an independent Whis-
tleblower Office at the IRS and delegated authority for reviewing 
claims and determining awards with that office.116 
 The independent Whistleblower Office, however, has not proven to 
be much different than the IRS prior to 2006. In fact, the similarities 
between the Whistleblower Office and the IRS prior to 2006 have 
even continued to determination letters, which still offer little to no 
explanation for denials.117  
B.   Lack of Explanations 
 By relying on privacy and disclosure laws, the IRS issues deter-
mination letters providing no insight into why awards were denied.118 
Section 6103 of the Code relates to the confidentiality and disclosure 
of returns and return information. It states that returns and return 
information shall be confidential and no one with access to returns or 
return information shall disclose any of this information, unless an 
explicit legislative exception applies.119 If there is an unauthorized 
disclosure, a taxpayer may bring criminal 120  and civil 121  actions 
against individuals who violated section 6103 of the Code.  
 There are numerous exceptions to this general rule of confidential-
ity, but currently there is no exception that expressly permits the 
IRS to disclose taxpayer’s information to whistleblowers or courts 
reviewing whistleblower claims.122 The IRS has hidden behind section 
                                                                                                                                 
 116. Letter from U.S. Sen. Charles Grassley to Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, 
at 3 (June 21, 2010), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/ 
download/?id=ce408abf-57e3-4cba-b611-73929b35583b. 
 117. Ringo, 2014 WL 4976226, at *1. 
 118. Kasper v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 37, 39 (2011) (“Federal disclosure and other prevail-
ing laws prevent[] the Whistleblower Office from providing a specific explanation for the 
denials.”). 
 119. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2012). 
 120. Section 7213 of the Code imposes fines, imprisonment time, and discharge from 
his or her job for individuals who willfully disclose returns, or return information, as de-
fined in section 6103(b) of the Code. See I.R.C. § 7213(a).  
 121. Section 7431 of the Code permits taxpayers to bring a civil suit against the indi-
viduals who knowingly or negligently inspected or disclosed the taxpayer’s information. 
The amount of damages that may be recovered includes the greater of actual damages, or 
$1000 for each unauthorized disclosure, plus costs and attorney fees in certain circum-
stances. See I.R.C. § 7431(a)–(c).  
 122. The current Treasury Regulations state that the IRS should use the exception 
under section 6013(h)(4) of the Code to authorize the disclosures made by the Whistleblow-
er Office in the course of the whistleblower administrative proceeding. See Treas. 
Reg. § 301.7623-1 (2014). 
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6103 of the Code in refusing to provide specific information that 
would permit meaningful judicial review of its denials of whistle-
blower claims.  
 For example, in Cooper v. Commissioner, the IRS’s reasons for 
denying the claim were taken verbatim from the Internal Revenue 
Manual (IRM) list of possible reasons for denying claims.123 The letter 
stated that an award determination could not be made because the 
whistleblower “did not identify . . . federal tax issue[s] upon which 
the IRS will take action” and the whistleblower’s information did not 
“result in the detection of the underpayment of taxes.”124 Similarly, in 
Kasper v. Commissioner,  
the denial letter[] recited a boilerplate list of common reasons for 
not allowing an award, including: (1) The application provided in-
sufficient information; (2) the information provided did not result 
in the recovery of taxes, penalties, or fines; or (3) the [IRS] already 
had the information provided or such information was available in 
public records.125 
 In non-whistleblower cases, courts have invalidated similar agen-
cy determinations due to a lack of a reasonable explanation. In Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, the Supreme Court found that 
determinations should allow courts to assess whether the agency has 
been faithful to the statutes and whether its decision passed the arbi-
trary and capricious standard.126 An agency’s action is considered ar-
bitrary and capricious if it “failed to consider an important aspect of 
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter 
to evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”127 
Similarly, courts have refused to accord deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of a regulation that merely parroted the statutory 
language.128  
 There are numerous benefits to transparency. Giving reasoned 
explanations in determinations forces the agency to “disclose the rel-
evant data, the values and assumptions in play, and the trade-offs 
entailed in the choice.”129 It also helps facilitate political accountabil-
ity, and demonstrates the respect that the government owes to its 
                                                                                                                                 
 123. See Cooper v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 70, 76 (2010). 
 124. Id. at 72. 
 125. Kasper v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 37, 39 (2011). 
 126. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 403 (1971). 
 127. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 128. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006). 
 129. Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 
1771, 1788 (2014). 
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citizens.130 Furthermore, it may improve the quality of agency’s deci-
sion-making131 and promote consistency.132  
 Many areas of tax law recognize these benefits and, after the en-
actment of section 7522 of the Code, require that the IRS state “the 
basis” for the certain determinations.133 These areas include notices 
of deficiency, post-assessment notices and demands for payment, no-
tices generated by IRS information-return matching programs, and 
revenue agent reports.134 The new whistleblower statute was enacted 
after section 7522 of the Code;135 thus, it is uncertain whether it 
should apply to section 7623(b) of the Code. However, legislative his-
tory suggests that the IRS is expected to make efforts to improve the 
clarity of all notices and explanations that are sent to taxpayers.136  
 Furthermore, section 7522 of the Code “does not articulate specific 
standards for determining whether the description of the Commis-
sioner’s basis is adequate . . . .”137 It has been held, however, that the 
notice must contain enough information to allow the taxpayer to craft 
a meaningful Tax Court petition challenging the notice.138 By apply-
ing this standard, whistleblower determinations would likely be con-
sidered inadequate. 
 This Note is not arguing that the IRS should be required to pro-
vide better explanations in their notices. While reasoned explana-
tions are useful, there are downsides as well.139 This Note is arguing, 
however, that if the IRS continues to issue determinations with inad-
equate explanations, the Tax Court must compensate elsewhere in 
order to assess whether the agency has been faithful to the statutes 
and whether its decision is reasonable. This compensation should oc-
cur by reviewing an adequate and reliable amount of evidence.  
                                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1789. 
 132. Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Mak-
ing and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 563, 563 (2010) (arguing that the 
IRS should strive to treat similarly situated taxpayers in a similar fashion). 
 133. I.R.C. § 7522 (2012).  
 134. Johnson, supra note 129, at 1803. 
 135. Eighteen years after the enactment of section 7522 of the Code, to be exact. Tax 
Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 2922, 2958 (2006) 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7623).   
 136. I.R.C. § 7522(b). The Senate bill would have applied the direction more broadly, 
and the Conference Committee stated: “Although the provision is limited to the specified 
notices, the conferees expect the IRS to make every effort to improve the clarity of all no-
tices and explanations that are sent to taxpayers.” H.R. REP. No. 100-1104, pt. 2, at 219 
(1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5279. 
 137. Shea v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 183, 196 n.20 (1999). 
 138. Cadwell v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 38, 49 (2011), aff’d, 483 F. App’x 847 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 139. Johnson, supra note 129, at 1789 (requiring explanations may lead judges to out-
come-driven decision making and negatively affect the quality of agencies’ efforts by adding 
additional requirements).  
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C.   History of Internal Control Issues in the IRS 
 Based on the history of TIGTA audits of the IRS, there is serious 
reason to doubt the reliability of the IRS’s evidence. The historical 
trend of internal control deficiencies within the IRS suggests that the 
administrative record is inadequate for appeals.140  
 A 2006 TIGTA audit report revealed that 76% of claims provided 
insufficient justification for rejection.141 Approximately 14% of these 
files were missing important information (such as copies of key forms 
and records of letters to informants). In fact, four claims could not even 
be located despite the fact that they were listed on the database.142 
 Even in the cases of paid claims, 32% did not contain enough evi-
dence to determine the justification for the percentage paid.143 Almost 
one-half (45%) of the case files reviewed had control issues, such as 
missing key evidence.144 Overall, the 2006 audit expressed “that a 
lack of standardized procedures and limited managerial oversight” 
were evident in the results.145  
 The creation of an independent Whistleblower Office did not pro-
duce better results. In 2009, TIGTA evaluated the period beginning 
with the implementation of the Whistleblower Office through 2009, 
and again cited major deficiencies in the internal controls.146 With 
respect to rejected claims, the auditors were unable to determine the 
reviewer’s rationale in rejecting those claims in 75% of the cases re-
viewed.147 With respect to paid claims, 45% had problems with control 
issues, such as missing copies of key forms.148 Also, 32% did not pro-
vide sufficient documentation to justify the award percentage.149  
 Moreover, in 2009, the IRS attempted to consolidate claim infor-
mation from three systems into one, which produced even more inac-
curacies.150 The IRS did not ensure that proper steps were taken to 
reconcile and correct inaccurate information from prior years.151  
                                                                                                                                 
 140. See infra Part II.C. 
 141. INFORMANTS’ REWARDS PROGRAM, supra note 60, at 7 (“In 76 percent of the reject-
ed informant claims included in our review, we were unable to determine the rationale for 
the reviewer’s decision to reject the claim, based on information in the case file.”).  
 142. Id. at 6.  
 143. Id. at 7. 
 144. Id. at 6. 
 145. Id. 
 146. DEFICIENCIES, supra note 21, at 15 (“The overall objective of this review was to 
evaluate the implementation of the Whistleblower Office,” which was established in 2006.). 
 147. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
 148. Id. (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 8-9. 
 151. Id. 
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 In 2012, an audit was conducted to follow up on the adequacy of 
the corrective actions the IRS agreed to implement subsequent to the 
2009 audit.152 TIGTA concluded that the IRS “did not fully and ade-
quately address the prior cited internal control weaknesses.”153  It 
summed up the potential of the Program and its downfalls by stating: 
“The Whistleblower Program provides the IRS with an opportunity to 
recover potentially billions of dollars in taxes, penalties, and inter-
est . . . . However, the IRS did not have an effective inventory control 
system or adequate procedures and processes at the time of our re-
view.” 154 These deficiencies existed before enactment of section 
7623(b) of the Code and still exist today.  
III.   TAX COURT’S SCOPE OF REVIEW 
 This Part explores how whistleblowers could obtain meaningful 
appeals through an appropriate scope of review. Due to the consider-
ations discussed above, the Tax Court should not limit the evidence it 
considers to the administrative record; rather, it should take evi-
dence as per its historical scope of review.155 The Tax Court should 
not strictly confine itself to the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA),156 which generally requires that courts stay within the admin-
istrative record when reviewing agency actions.157 Further, even if 
strictly applying the APA, the Tax Court is not bound to the adminis-
trative record. Rather it may, and should, require enough evidence so 
that it can justify the agency’s action.  
A.   The Tax Court Should Apply Its 
Traditional Scope of Review 
 The IRS has maintained that the APA applies to the Tax Court for 
whistleblower appeals.158 It takes this position because the IRS is an 
                                                                                                                                 
 152. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, REF. NO. 
2012-30-045, IMPROVED OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY PROCESS WHISTLEBLOWER 
CLAIMS  5 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2012reports/ 
201230045fr.pdf. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Memorandum from Michael R. Phillips, Deputy Inspector Gen. for Audit, to the 
Deputy Comm’r for Servs. & Enforcement (Aug. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/200930114fr.html. 
 155. Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 55 (2004) (“Congress has not imposed a restrictive 
standard for this Court's review of the Commissioner's determinations under section 6015. 
Clearly, when it enacted section 6015, Congress was aware that this is a trial court that 
has historically resolved cases by taking evidence and has never been governed by the 
APA.”), rev’d, Comm’r v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Tax Court 
did not have jurisdiction over Ewing’s petition). 
 156. See APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2012). 
 157. See id. § 706. 
 158. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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“agency” within the meaning of section 511 of the APA,159 and the 
APA generally requires the record rule for review of agency determi-
nations.160 The Supreme Court has confirmed that administrative law 
applies to Tax Court cases.161  
 Applying the record rule, however, conflicts with the Tax Court’s 
traditional scope of review. The Tax Court has “historically resolved 
cases by taking evidence” unless Congress has imposed a restrictive 
standard.162 Also, the Tax Court has maintained that the APA does 
not govern it.163 A longstanding example of this is seen in deficiency 
cases where the Court must re-determine a taxpayer’s liability.164 
During these re-determinations, the Court has traditionally taken 
evidence.165 
 Furthermore, in Collection Due Process (CDP) cases, the Tax 
Court will take evidence outside of the administrative record. 166 CDP 
cases arise when a taxpayer has a deficiency and the IRS files notice 
of its tax lien or levies on a property.167 The Tax Court has held that 
when the validity of the underlying tax liability is at issue, the Court 
may take evidence when reviewing the IRS’s determination.168 
 Spousal relief cases also do not apply the record rule.169 These cas-
es arise when spouses file their tax returns jointly and there is an 
understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of one of the 
                                                                                                                                 
 159. See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (defining “agency” as “each authority of the 
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by anoth-
er agency,” subject to exceptions not relevant here). 
 160. See id. § 706. 
 161. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53-
58 (2011).  
 162. Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 55 (2004) (“Congress has not imposed a restrictive 
standard for this Court’s review of the Commissioner’s determinations under section 6015. 
Clearly, when it enacted section 6015, Congress was aware that [the Tax Court] is a trial 
court that has historically resolved cases by taking evidence . . . .”). 
 163. Id. (“[The Tax Court] . . . has never been governed by the APA.”). 
 164. Id. at 37 (“It is well established that the APA does not apply to deficiency cases in 
this Court; that is, cases arising under sections 6213 or 6214 in which we may redetermine 
the taxpayer’s tax liability.”). 
 165. Id. (“We make redeterminations under section 6213(a) de novo.”). 
 166. Goza v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 176, 181-82 (2000) (applying a de novo standard of re-
view “where the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue”).  
 167. I.R.C. § 6330(a) (2012). 
 168. Goza, 114 T.C. at 181-82. Note that where the validity of the underlying tax liabil-
ity is not properly at issue, the Court will review the agency’s determination under the 
deferential abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. at 182. 
 169. Porter v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 203, 214 (2009) (“[W]e are no longer restricted to de-
termining whether the Commissioner's determination was an abuse of discretion. Under a 
de novo standard of review, we take into account all the facts and circumstances and de-
termine whether it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for the unpaid tax or 
deficiency.”). 
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spouses.170 The Tax Court will permit relief to the other individual if 
he or she did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was an 
understatement.171 Thus, the Tax Court will take evidence even when 
there is a deficiency related to another individual. This practice has 
continued after the enactment of the APA172 and after the Supreme 
Court’s decision that administrative law applies to tax.173  
 Accordingly, when Congress has not imposed a strict standard, the 
Tax Court has considered evidence it deems appropriate. Congress 
does not pass statutes in a vacuum and is aware that the Tax Court 
has historically resolved cases by taking evidence.174 By conferring 
jurisdiction to the Tax Court, Congress may have intended that the 
Tax Court proceedings be conducted in accordance with the rules 
prescribed by the Tax Court. In determining Congressional intent, 
courts will often analyze the language of the statue.175 The language 
of the new whistleblower statute is nearly identical to the language 
of the CDP statute. Thus, by analogy to CDP cases, precedent has 
already indicated that the language in the tax whistleblower statute 
does not confine the court to the administrative record.176  
 The language from the CDP provision in section 6330(d) of the 
Code provides that “[t]he person may, within 30 days of a determina-
tion under this section, appeal such determination to the Tax Court 
(and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such mat-
ter).”177 Almost identically, section 7623(b) of the Code provides that 
“[a]ny determination regarding an award under paragraph (1), (2), or 
(3) may, within 30 days of such determination, be appealed to the 
Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to 
such matter).”178 Thus, as the Court has previously allowed new evi-
dence in CDP cases, the statutory language alone does not constrict 
                                                                                                                                 
 170. I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Porter v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 122 (2008) (“Review for abuse of discretion does 
not trigger application of the APA record rule or preclude us from conducting a de novo 
trial. Our longstanding practice has been to hold trials de novo in many situations where 
an abuse of discretion standard applies. In those cases, our practice has not been to limit 
taxpayers to evidence contained in the administrative record or arguments made by the 
taxpayer at the administrative level.”). 
 173. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53-58 
(2011) (holding that administrative law applies to Tax Court cases). 
 174. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 105 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he general 
provisions of the APA are applicable only when Congress has not intended that a different 
standard be used in the administration of a specific statute.”). 
 175. Wilson, 705 F.3d at 987 (“The first question in this case is whether the Tax Court 
properly considered new evidence in considering Wilson’s appeal. Resolution of the issue 
turns on statutory analysis.”). 
 176. See Goza v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000). 
 177. See I.R.C. § 6330(d) (2012). 
 178. Id. § 7623(b)(4). 
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whistleblower appeals to the record. The Tax Court has suggested 
this view in a recent press release, discussed below. 
 In a June 2008 press release containing proposed amendments to 
the Court’s rules regarding whistleblower actions, the Tax Court in-
dicated that it does not consider itself strictly bound to the adminis-
trative record: 
The Court’s Rules generally contemplate disposition on the admin-
istrative record for disclosure actions and declaratory judgment ac-
tions, pursuant to specific legislative guidance. Without specific 
statutory authority or evidence of legislative intent establishing 
whether whistleblower award actions are to be decided on the ad-
ministrative record, [the portion of the Tax Court rules applicable 
to whistleblower actions] as proposed follows the general proce-
dures for deficiency and other types of actions before the Court.179 
 The Tax Court revised this comment in an October 2008 press re-
lease stating that “[w]ithout specific statutory direction establishing 
whether whistleblower actions are to be decided on the administra-
tive record, the Court contemplates that the appropriate scope of re-
view will be developed in case law.”180  
 The Tax Court’s position appears contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Mayo Foundation, which confirmed that administrative 
law applies to tax.181 However, that decision did not command that 
the Tax Court blindly apply the APA and ignore traditional rules and 
Congressional intent. The “general provisions of the APA are appli-
cable only when Congress has not intended that a different standard 
be used in the administration of a specific statute.”182 As such, Dis-
trict Courts have upheld that the Tax Court may take evidence based 
on the text, structure, and/or legislative history of the statute.183 
 As noted, the text and structure of the whistleblower statute mir-
rors the CDP statute, which takes evidence. Furthermore, section 
7623(b) of the Code came from one of two competing bills.184. The bill 
that was not enacted, included in the Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Re-
                                                                                                                                 
 179. Press Release, U.S. Tax Court (June 2, 2008), available at http:// 
www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/060208.pdf. 
 180. Press Release, U.S. Tax Court (Oct. 3, 2008), available at http:// 
www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/100308.pdf. 
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form Act of 2005,185 appeared to require a limited review, restricted to 
the administrative record.  
 The relevant portion of the bill read: “The determination of the 
amount of such award by the Whistleblower Office shall depend upon 
the extent to which the individual substantially contributed to such 
action, and shall be determined at the sole discretion of the Whistle-
blower Office.”186 The enacted whistleblower statute removed the por-
tion that provided “and shall be determined at the sole discretion of 
the Whistleblower Office.”187 By limiting the IRS’s discretion, Con-
gress may have implied that the Tax Court should be able to take 
evidence. Senator Levin, who introduced the bills, reinforced this in-
terpretation by stating:  
The one key difference between our bill and the Finance Commit-
tee provisions is that . . . our bill would not enable whistleblowers 
to appeal to a court to obtain additional sums. The fact-specific 
analysis that goes into evaluating a whistleblower’s assistance and 
calculating a reward makes court review inadvisable.188  
 The bill that was passed, however, includes an option for this 
“fact-specific analysis.” It directs appeals to the Tax Court,189 whereas 
the other bill did not provide jurisdiction to a specific court.  
 Accordingly, as the text, structure, and legislative history of the 
whistleblower statute do not impose a strict standard, the Tax 
Court does not have to confine itself to the administrative record. 
Similar to cases determining deficiencies or granting spousal relief, 
the Court should take evidence when analyzing deficiencies exposed 
by whistleblowers.  
B.   Even If the Record Rule Applies, the 
Tax Court May Take Evidence 
 Even if the Tax Court applies the record rule, Supreme Court 
precedent suggests that the Tax Court may, and will likely have to, 
consider new evidence.190 The underlying principle for judicial review 
of an agency decision was outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
SEC v. Chenery Corp. in 1943.191 The Court held that “the orderly 
functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon 
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which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and ade-
quately sustained.”192 The Court further stated that “an administra-
tive order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agen-
cy acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can 
be sustained.”193  
 While courts are unable to impose additional procedural require-
ments on agencies,194 these same restrictions do not apply when re-
questing additional evidence. The reviewing court must have an ade-
quate record in order to fulfill its duties.195 In order to obtain suffi-
cient evidence, a court may either: (1) developed its own record, or 
(2) remand back to the agency so that it may supplement the admin-
istrative record to justify its actions.  
 In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, the Supreme Court 
found that the administrative record did not allow for the “full, 
prompt review of the Secretary’s action . . . without additional delay 
which would result from having a remand to the Secretary.”196 As the 
record was inadequate, the Court held that it was necessary for the 
reviewing court “to require some explanation in order to determine if 
the Secretary acted within the scope of his authority and if the Secre-
tary’s action was justifiable under the applicable standard.”197 In ob-
taining this additional evidence, the Supreme Court permitted the 
reviewing court to create its own evidentiary record.198  
 In Camp v. Pitts, the Supreme Court held that remand to the 
agency is preferred over the reviewing court developing its own rec-
ord in circumstances where there is “contemporaneous explanation of 
the agency decision.”199 The Court was hesitant to “put aside the ex-
tensive administrative record already made” and held that a court 
would be permitted to go outside the record if there was a “failure to 
explain administrative action as to frustrate effective judicial re-
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view.”200 If such a failure exists, the agency’s “decision must be vacat-
ed and the matter remanded to [the agency] for further considera-
tion.”201 Then the reviewing court must determine whether and to 
what extent “further explanation is necessary to a proper assessment 
of the agency’s decision.”202 
 The Tax Court, however, does not always allow for remand to the 
agency. In spousal relief cases, the Tax Court has held that “[s]ection 
6015(e) not only makes no mention of remand, it instructs the Tax 
Court to proceed de novo when reviewing certain § 6015(f) peti-
tions.”203 Furthermore, precedent restricts the Tax Court from re-
manding spousal relief cases to the Commissioner for further admin-
istrative consideration because it is a “stand alone” case.204 Accord-
ingly, when the administrative record is insufficient, the Tax Court 
may develop its own evidentiary record or remand back to the IRS 
when it is allowed.  
 Currently, the Tax Court will be unable to justify the IRS’s actions 
by analyzing the bare determination letters.205 Furthermore, based 
on the substantial, pervasive, and consistent failures within the 
Whistleblower Office, the record is unreliable and will not adequately 
explain the agency’s action in a majority of appeals.206 Applying the 
record rule will undoubtedly frustrate effective judicial review, as 
already demonstrated in Anonymous 1 and Anonymous 2 and Rin-
go.207 Strict enforcement of the record rule will not be an option in 
most appeals. As such, the Tax Court will either remand back to the 
agency or create its own record.  
 As indicated in Camp, remand is preferred in circumstances 
where there is an “extensive administrative record already made” 
and there is a “contemporaneous explanation of the agency deci-
sion.”208 In tax whistleblower appeals, neither of these exists. The 
administrative record has been inadequate and unreliable rather 
than “extensive.” Furthermore, there cannot be a “contemporaneous 
explanation” in a tax whistleblower appeal. If a claim is accepted for 
examination, the IRS will only issue or deny an award after it com-
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pletes its investigation.209 Finally, remand will be impossible in many 
cases as the IRS will be unable to appropriately supplement the ad-
ministrative record due to missing evidence.210  
 As in Overton Park, the Tax Court should develop its own record 
when the administrative record is insufficient. Remanding to the IRS 
does not currently appear to be a viable option due to material weak-
nesses in internal controls, which have resulted in missing evidence. 
Similar to spousal relief cases, when remanding to the agency is not 
an option, the Court must develop its own evidentiary record because 
that “appears to be the ‘only means by which [the Tax Court] can 
supplement an insufficient record’ . . . .”211  
 District Courts may overrule more independent approaches in fa-
vor of remand, as per the Supreme Court holding in Camp v. Pitts. 
However, based on the widespread failures within the IRS, the most 
effective and efficient method of review may be for the Tax Court to 
develop its own evidentiary record.  
CONCLUSION 
 The whistleblower statute could be the most effective method of 
narrowing the $385 billion tax gap. The long-term success of the pro-
gram, however, may be undermined if the Whistleblower Office does 
not cooperate with whistleblowers and issue awards as appropriate. 
The Tax Court may be able to influence the success of the program by 
providing meaningful appeals. However, these appeals will only be 
meaningful if the Tax Court is able to consider adequate and reliable 
evidence.  
 Currently, the administrative record does not constitute adequate 
or reliable evidence. Internal control failures within the Whistle-
blower Office have resulted in missing evidence in a majority of the 
cases. Furthermore, the lack of requirements for what must be in-
cluded in the administrative record has led to even less protection for 
whistleblowers.  
 The Tax Court should develop its own evidentiary record to pro-
vide a meaningful appeal. The statutory text, structure, and legisla-
tive history point the Tax Court to utilize its traditional scope of re-
view. Even if the record rule applies, the Tax Court will need to take 
evidence in a majority of cases or it will inadvertently reject proper 
appeals as already demonstrated in early cases.  
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